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Naturalizing Metaethics
Jesse Prinz
Decades ago, it was suggested that epistemology could be naturalized, meaning,
roughly, that it could be treated as an empirically-informed psychological inquiry.
In more recent years, there has been a concerted effort to naturalize ethics, with a
focus on questions in moral psychology, and occasional normative ethics. Less ef-
fort has been put into the naturalization of metaethics: the study of what, if any-
thing, makes moral judgments true. The discussion presents a systematic overview
of core questions in metaethics, and argues that each of these can be illuminated
by psychological research. These include questions about realism, expressivism,
error theory,  and relativism. Metaethics is  beholden to moral  psychology,  and
moral psychology can be studied empirically. The primary goal is to establish em-
pirical tractability, but, in so doing, the paper also takes a provisional stance on
core questions,  defending a view that is  relativist,  subjective,  and emotionally
grounded.
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1 Introduction
Moral philosophy has taken an empirical turn,
with  experimental  results  being  brought  to
bear  on  core  questions  in  moral  psychology
(e.g., is altruism motivated by empathy?) and
normative ethics  (e.g.,  how plausible  are the
presuppositions  of  virtue  theory?).  Some  of
the recent empirical work also bears on core
questions in metaethics. Metaethical questions
are  varied,  but  they  broadly  concern  the
foundations of moral judgments. What is the
basis  of  such  judgments?  What,  if  anything,
could render them true? Here I will argue that
these questions can be empirically addressed,
and  longstanding  debates  between  leading
metaethical theories may ultimately be settled
experimentally.  I  will  describe  empirical  res-
ults that bear on core metaethical questions. I
will  not  present  these  results  in  detail  here.
My goal is programmatic: I seek to establish
the empirical tractability of metaethics. Some
of the experiments I describe are exploratory
pilot studies, presented in an effort to motiv-
ate more research. Even with such preliminary
results, we will see that some metaethical the-
ories  already enjoy greater empirical support
than others. I will argue that the best-suppor-
ted theory at this stage of inquiry is a form of
relativist sentimentalism. Defending this posi-
tion is subsidiary to my primary goal of ad-
vertising  the  value  of  empirical  methods  in
metaethical  theorizing.  There  has  already
been  an  empirical  turn  in  ethics,  but
metaethics has been less explicitly targeted by
these new approaches.
Talking about “an empirical turn” clearly
alludes to another turn in the recent history of
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philosophy: the linguistic turn. When philosoph-
ers  turned  their  attention  to  language,  there
was an effort to recast philosophical problems
as linguistic in nature. A new set of technical
tools  was  brought  into  the  field:  formal  se-
mantics. Logic has been part of philosophy his-
torically, but after the linguistic turn it was per-
ceived to be an essential  component of  philo-
sophical training. Just as formal semantics in-
creased  philosophical  precision  with  the  lin-
guistic turn, empirical methods have dramatic-
ally augmented our tool chest, and stubborn de-
bates may begin to give way. The empirical turn
is as momentous as the linguistic turn, and per-
haps even more so. Formal semantics allowed us
to articulate differences  between theories,  and
empirical  methods  provide  new  opportunities
for theory confirmation. Neither turn rendered
traditional  approaches  to  philosophy idle,  but
rather supplemented them. Within metaethics,
this supplementation may offer the best hope of
settling which competing theories are true. 
In calling for a naturalist metaethics, it is
important  to  avoid  confusion  with  two  other
views. “Naturalism” is sometimes construed as a
metaphysical thesis, and also sometimes as a se-
mantic  thesis.  Metaphysically,  “naturalism”
refers  to  the view that  everything that  exists
belongs to the natural world, as opposed to the
non-natural,  or  supernatural  world.  This  is
sometimes presented as a synonym for physical-
ism, which can be defined as the view that the
world described by the physical sciences is com-
plete,  in  that  any  physical  duplicate  of  this
world  would  be  a  duplicate  simpliciter.  The
causal closure of the physical world and the suc-
cess of physical science are taken as evidence for
this metaphysical view. Semantic naturalism at-
tempts to reductively analyze concepts from one
domain in terms of another, which is considered
more  likely  to  be  natural  in  a  metaphysical
sense. In philosophy of mind, this might involve
defining  psychological  concepts  in  neural  or
causal terms, while in ethics it might involve de-
fining  moral  properties  in  terms  of  psycholo-
gical, logical, or social terms (such as hedonic
states, principles of reason, or social contracts).
Here I will be concerned with methodogical nat-
uralism, which has recent roots in the work of
W.V.O. Quine, who grew skeptical about philo-
sophizing  through linguistic  analysis,  and em-
phasized the empricial revisability of philosoph-
ical claims (1969).  Quine drew on the methods
of John Dewey, and insisted that “knowledge,
mind, and meaning […] are to be studied in the
same empricial spirit that animates nautral sci-
ence” (1969, p. 26). More succinctly, methodolo-
gical naturalism can be defined as follows:
Methodological  naturalism  =Df the  view
that we should study a domain using em-
pirical methods. 
This  is  the  kind  of  naturalism that  has  long
been advocated, but too rarely followed, in the
domain  of  epistemology  (Kornblith 1985).
Neither  metaphysical  nor  semantic  naturalism
are  equivalent  to  methodological  naturalism.
Metaphysical naturalism is a view about what
exists, not about how to study it. Indeed, some
non-naturalists  in  this  metaphysical  sense  be-
lieve  that  empirical  methods  can  be  used  to
study non-physical or supernatural entities. Se-
mantic naturalism is a view about how to state
theories (viz., in reductionist terms), but practi-
tioners have rarely used empirical science in de-
fense of such theories (consider so-called natur-
alistic  semantics).  Methodological  naturalism
has been deployed in discussions of both first-
order ethics (e.g., Brandt 1959; Flanagan 1991;
Doris 1998;  Greene 2007)  and  in  metaethics
(e.g.,  Railton 1993;  Prinz 2007b).  As  Railton
points out, a naturalist methodology could res-
ult in a reductionist theory of morality, but it
need not (see also Boyd 1988). In principle, sci-
ence  could  support  traditional  intuitionism,
which is not naturalistic in either of these other
senses. 
1.1 Methodological preamble
Philosophy  has  always  been  methodologically
pluralistic. Some use intuitions to arrive at ne-
cessary and sufficient conditions for the applica-
tion of concepts (e.g., Plato’s early dialogues).
Some try to systematize and revise a large set
of  beliefs  using  reflective  equilibrium  (e.g.,
Rawls on justice). Some use transcendental ar-
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guments to figure out preconditions for thought
and action (e.g., Kant). Some use aphorisms or
stories to reveal facts about ourselves or to envi-
sion  possible  alternatives  (e.g.,  Nietzsche  and
the existentialist tradition). Some propose his-
torical  analyses  of  prevailing  institutions  and
values (e.g., Hobbes, Rousseau, and Foucault).
Some disclose  hidden social  forces  that  buffer
prevailing  categories  (e.g.,  Marilyn  Frye  on
gender). Some analyze case studies (e.g., Kuhn),
probe the structure of experience (e.g., Husserl),
or  propose  formalizations  (e.g.,  Frege).  These
and other methods suggest that philosophy is a
many-splendored  thing,  and  among  its  many
forms one can also find the deployment of em-
pirical results. Examples include Descartes and
James on the emotions, Merleau-Ponty on em-
bodiment, and Wittgenstein on aspect percep-
tion. Empirical observations have often guided
philosophical inquiry. Locke was inspired by cor-
puscular  physics,  Marx  took  solace  in  Dar-
winian biology, and Carnap incorporated ideas
from behaviorism.
The term “empirical” is used in different
ways. In its broadest application, it refers to ob-
servational  methods.  Observation  can  include
an examination  of  the  world,  both  inner  and
outer,  with  and  without  special  instruments.
Even introspection can be regarded as a form of
observation, as the etymology of the term sug-
gests, and in this sense, the introspection of in-
tuitions is an observational method. Philosoph-
ers  who  use  intuitions  in  theory-construction
can be characterised as doing something empir-
ical  in  this  broad  sense.  Linguistics  has  used
such intuitions to construct syntactic theories,
and few would deny that syntax is an empirical
field.  But  the  term  “empirical”  is  also  used
more narrowly to refer to the use of scientific
methods, which involve the design of repeatable
observation procedures,  and the quantification
and mathematical analysis of data. The empir-
ical turn in philosophy has been marked by a
dramatic increase in the use of scientific results.
Many philosophers have long held a posit-
ive attitude toward science, but the frequent use
of scientific results (outside of the philosophies
of science) is a recent phenomenon. It became
popular  in  naturalized  epistemology,  which
draws  on  the  psychology  of  decision-making,
and philosophy of  mind,  which has drawn on
psychology, computer science, and artificial in-
telligence. Over the last decade, empirical meth-
ods have also become widely used, and widely
contested, in ethics. 
The  resistance  to  empirical  methods  in
ethics is often chalked up to the fact that ethics
is a normative domain, and empirical methods
provide  descriptive  results.  This  can  only  be
part of  the story,  however,  as  there has been
little  uptake  of  empirical  methods  in
metaethics. Metaethics is a descriptive domain;
it  does  not  tell  us  how  to  act  morally,  but
rather explores the semantic commitments and
metaphysical foundations of such claims. I sus-
pect the reason for resistance is less interesting
and  more  sociological.  Psychology  is  a  young
profession,  which  grew out  of  philosophy and
physiology  but  then  acquired  its  own  institu-
tional standing in the academy, and it has had
to fiercely guard its status as a science by dis-
tancing itself from the humanities. Meanwhile,
philosophy underwent an analytic  turn,  which
led to a preoccupation with conceptual analysis,
and an anxiety about psychologism. On this vis-
ion, the field began to model itself on logic or
mathematics, which were, in turn, taken to be a
priori domains.  I  think this  is  a  fundamental
mistake.  In  many domains,  the  concepts  that
matter most are grounded in human usage, not
in a transcendental realm like (allegedly) math-
ematics.  The  arbiters  of  conceptual  truth  in-
clude  both  the  inferences  we  are  inclined  to
draw and our linguistic behavior, both of which
can be studied empirically. I will not argue dir-
ectly against a priori  approaches,  but will  in-
stead make an empirical case, or better yet an
invitation, by attempting to illustrate how em-
pirical  findings  make  contact  with  traditional
philosophical questions in metaethics. 
One  manifestation  of  the  empirical  turn
has  been  the  rise  of  experimental  philosophy.
This  term  most  often  refers  to  the  work  of
philosophers  who  conduct  studies  that  probe
people’s intuitions about philosophical thought
experiments.  Strictly  speaking,  much  of  this
work is not experimental, since the term “exper-
iment”  is  often  reserved  in  psychological  re-
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search for studies in which researchers attempt
to manipulate the mental states of their parti-
cipants—experimental conditions are compared
against control conditions. Experimental philo-
sophy often explores standing intuitions, rather
than the factors that influence those intuitions
(e.g.,  Mikhail 2002). For example, some trolley
studies simply poll opinions about the permiss-
ability  of  certain  actions.  That  is  a  survey
rather than an experiment. One can use survey
methods to conduct experiments, however. For
example, one could conduct a trolley study in
which some vignettes use evocative language in
an effort to manipulate participants’ emotions.
Few  experimental  philosophy  studies  do  any-
thing like this. Most ask for opinions without
manipulating psychological states. Thus, experi-
mental  philosophy  characteristically  examines
the  content of  people’s  concepts  and  beliefs,
rather  than  the  underlying  psychological  pro-
cesses. In this sense, experimental philosophy is
an extension of conceptual analysis.  For those
interestested in underlying processes, it can, to
this extent, be of limited interest. Some experi-
mental philosophy has also  been criticized for
failing to meet standards of reliable behavioral
reseach (Woolfolk 2013). That said, conceptual
questions are often important for philosophical
theorizing,  and  methodological  problems  with
experimental  philosophy  can  be  addressed  by
conducting better and better experiments. Of-
ten the first efforts (including much of the work
I  will  describe  below)  are  best  regarded  as
analagous to pilot studies, in need of refinement
but successful enough to warrant more careful
investigation.  In  addition,  many  philosophers
draw on (and increasingly conduct) studies that
qualify  as  genuine  experiments  and  meet  the
standards of good social science. There is a long
tradition  of  philosophers  using  research  pub-
lished in social science journals to defend philo-
sophical positions. For those who find paradigm
cases  of  experimental  philosophy  too  limiting
(because  they  are  based  on  conceptual  intu-
itions or fail to meet certain standards), there
are  many  other  empirical  results  that  can
provide illumination. The term “empirical philo-
sophy” can be used as a broader label to cover
both opinion polls and experimental manipula-
tions. As I use the term, it refers to the use of
scientific results, whether obtained by a philo-
sopher  or  not,  to  address  philosophical  ques-
tions.  The  empirical  turn  should  not  be  dis-
missed as philosophy-through-opinion-polls; it is
a multi-pronged effort advance philosophical de-
bates  by drawing upon observational  methods
of any kind.
The motivations for the empirical turn are
varied, but the most general impetus is the be-
lief that some questions cannot be resolved by
more traditional philosophical methods. For ex-
ample,  philosophers  interested  in  the  physical
basis of consciousness cannot rely on introspec-
tion  or  on  an  analysis  of  the  concept  “con-
scious.” And even those interested in analysis of
concepts have worried about the limits of intro-
spection. There are basically three different the-
ories  of  what  concepts  are:  Platonic  entities,
emergent features of linguistic practice, or psy-
chological  states.  None  of  these  can  be  com-
pletely investigated by introspection. Even psy-
chological states can be difficult to introspect,
because  much  mental  activity  is  unconscious,
and because introspection may be prone to er-
ror  and bias.  Moreover,  even  if  a  philosopher
could perfectly introspect her own concepts, she
would not know thereby that others shared the
same concepts, and this would greatly limit the
scope of her theories. Some experimental philo-
sophers  have  argued  that  philosophers’  intu-
itions are not shared by laypeople. When philo-
sophers  and laypeople  do  agree  on  intuitions,
there is still no guarantee that these accurately
reflect  reality.  For  example,  most  people  (at
least in the West) find it  intuitively plausible
that human action derives from character traits,
but some empirical philosophers (most notably
Owen Flanagan, John Doris, and Gilbert Har-
man) have drawn attention to psychological re-
search that challenges this assumption.
Traditional  and  empirical  approaches  to
philosophy are  sometimes  placed in  opposition,
but they can also be regarded as interdependent.
On one division of labor, traditional methods are
used to pose questions and to devise theories that
might answer those questions. Empirical methods
can then be used to test these theories. This is an
over-simplification,  of  course,  because  observa-
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tions can inspire theories, and traditional meth-
ods can sometimes refute theories (Gettier cases
are a parade example in epistemology), but the
proposed division of labor is a decent approxima-
tion.  Traditional  methods  have  limited  testing
power because theoretical posits are often difficult
to directly observe, and empirical methods have
limited  power  in  constructing  theories,  because
theories outstrip evidence. In what follows I will
test theories derived from philosophical reflection
against the tribunal of empirical evidence.
1.2 A roadmap to metaethics
Let  us  turn  now  to  the  focus  of  discussion:
metaethics.  Metaethical  questions  concern  the
nature of the moral domain. Metaethicists ask:
what kinds of things are we talking about when
we  make  moral  judgements?  Put  differently,
metaethics  concerns the truthmakers  of  moral
judgements:  what kinds of facts,  if  any, make
moral judgements true? That is a metaphysical
question  but  it  is  normally  approached  se-
mantically by exploring what we are semantic-
ally committed to when we make moral judge-
ments. Metaethics differs from first-order ethics,
which concerns the content, derivation, and ap-
plication of such judgements. 
There are many different metaethical the-
ories, and a complete survey here would be im-
possible.  I  will  focus  on  major  theories  that
have  emerged over  the  last  two  hundred  and
fifty  years,  with  emphasis  on  proposals  that
dominated discussion in the twentieth century.
To be clear from the outset, my goal is not to
consider  specific  theories  that  have  been  ad-
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vanced  by  currently  active  authors  in
metaethics. Rather, I will survey broader classes
of theories that have been around for some time
(decades or centuries) in an effort to establish
the relevance  of  empirical  work.  An adequate
examination of any recent theory would require
a  narrower  focus  than I  am after  here,  since
each theory makes empirical commitments, if at
all, in different places. 
To  facilitate  discussion,  I  will  map  out
the theories  of  interest  using a decision tree
(Figure  1). The tree could easily be arranged
differently.  Almost  any  branch  could  be  the
starting  place,  with  other  nodes  occurring
higher  or  lower than they are in  this  rendi-
tion. As we will see in a moment, I begin with
a  question  about  “affect”  or  emotions.  This
may  seem  odd  to  some  contemporary
metaethicists.  Some  contemporary  metaethi-
cists discuss emotions (such as  Alan Gibbard
1990, and Simon Blackburn 1998), but others
do  not  (for  example,  emotions  are  discussed
less  among moral  realists).  Historically,  how-
ever,  emotions  have  been  a  central  focus  in
metaethics.  British  moralists,  who  advanced
many of the questions that continue to drive
the subfield, often begin their analyses with a
discussion  of  moral  sentiments.  Indeed,  the
most famous controversy in metaethics before
the twentieth century is probably the dispute
between  British  sentimentalism  and  Kantian
rationalism.  Even  in  the  twentieth  century,
some  of  the  most  discussed  debates  concern
emotions, such as the debate between emotiv-
ists and their opponents. Moreover, the recent
empirical turn was triggered, in part, by dis-
coveries linking emotions to moral judgement.
So this starting point has considerable histor-
ical depth and great relevance to the method-
ological  sea-change  that  I  am  interested  in
here. That said, I don’t intend this tree to be
anything like a complete map of meta-ethics.
One could begin elsewhere and branch out in
further directions (I expand the tree leftward,
but interesting questions also come up on the
right).  Though incomplete,  the nodes of  this
tree encompass much of what one might cover
in an introduction to metaethics in the Anglo-
phone analytic tradition. 
The first  question  in  the  metaethics  de-
cision tree is, I note, a question about emotions.
More precisely, we can ask: are moral judgments
affect-laden? The term “affect” is used instead
of “emotion” here, because it is broader. I in-
tend the term to cover any conative state, such
as a preference, desire, or pro-attitude. For most
of  this  discussion,  I  will  focus  on  emotions
rather than these other affective constructs, be-
cause emotions are implicated in the empirical
work I will be considering.
The other key term in question 1 is “moral
judgments.”  By  “moral  judgments”  I  mean
atomic  judgments  using  thin  moral  concepts,
such as  wrong,  bad, or  immoral. The judgment
expressed by “Shoplifting is wrong” would be an
example. There are many other judgments that
arise  in  moral  contexts,  including  judgments
containing thick concepts, such as  cruel or  un-
just. One can also ask whether these are affect-
laden. On one analysis, thick concepts are hy-
brids that have both a descriptive and an evalu-
ative component, the latter of which may im-
plicate the emotions. For the sake of simplicitly
I will ignore that debate here.
Notice that judgements are not sentences
but  rather  the  thoughts  that  sentences  ex-
press.  To propose that such thoughts are af-
fect-laden is to say that each token instance
involves  an  emotion  or  other  conative  state.
There  are  different  forms  of  “involvement”
that  have  been  discussed  in  metaethics.  On
some theories, moral judgments contain conat-
ive states as constituent parts.  This was the
view of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and
some  other  British  moralists.  One  might
weaken this  by saying that  moral  judgments
do not contain emotions, but refer to them. In
this vein, John McDowell, David Wiggins, and
Alan  Gibbard  suggest  that  moral  judgments
reflect the conviction or norm that it would be
warranted  to  feel  certain  emotions.  Both  of
these approaches have gone under the heading
“sentimentalism,”  with  the  prefix  “neo-”  for
the  views  that  say  the  link  between  moral
judgments and emotions is second-order. Here
is a definition:
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Sentimentalism  =Df Moral  judgments  es-
sentially  involve  affective  states,  such  as
emotions, in one of two ways: such states
are constituent parts of moral judgments
(traditional  sentimentalism);  or  moral
judgments are judgments about the appro-
priateness of such states (neo-sentimental-
ism).
Those who deny that moral judgments are af-
fect-laden fall into different categories, but two
of the most important metaethical theories  of
this  kind  are  externalist  moral  realism  and
(some forms of) rationalism. Moral realists say
that there are moral facts, which is to say that
some states of affairs are truly right or wrong
(cf.  Sayre-McCord 1988).  Externalist  moral
realists  add  a  further  requirement,  namely
mind-independence:
Externalism moral realism =Df There are
moral  facts  and  these  obtain  independ-
ently of our recognition of them.
If moral facts are mind-independent, it also fol-
lows that we can come to know them without
being moved by them. Like scientific facts, we
can know that they obtain without feeling any
way towards them. Cornell realists, some intu-
itionists,  and many divine  command theorists
fall  into  this  category.  Moral  rationalism is  a
view about how the epistemology or normative
status of moral truths:
Moral rationalism =Df Moral truths can be
discovered  and  justified  though  a  purely
rational decision procedure. 
Kant (1797)  is  traditionally  read  this  way,
though he also  claimed that moral  judgments
involve moral feelings. 
The remainder of my metaethics decision
tree concerns those who think that moral judg-
ments are affect-laden.  Among those  who say
that moral judgments essentially involve conat-
ive states, there is a divide between those who
think  that  moral  judgments  are  nevertheless
truth-apt and those who deny this. This is the
second division of the tree. A judgment is truth-
apt if it is the kind of thing that can be evalu-
ated as  true or  false.  Some affect-laden judg-
ments may turn out to have a merely expressive
function. If I say, “Disco sucks!” I may not be
attempting to represent a fact, but merely ex-
pressing  how  I  feel.  Expressivists  follow  this
analogy:
Expressivism =Df Moral assertions express
mere  feelings  or  non-assertoric  attitudes,
and do not purport to convey facts.
Charles Stevenson and A. J. Ayer are credited
with devising the emotivist theory of morality,
which  is  the  simplest  theory  of  this  kind.  A
more sophisticated variant has been developed
by Simon Blackburn, who proposes that moral
judgments aspire for quasi-truth, but not truth,
and  thus  an  ontologically  neutral  stand-in—
which can explain why moral  judgments have
an  assertoric  form.  Alan  Gibbard  says  that
moral  judgments  do not  directly  express  feel-
ings, as emotivists claim, but rather express the
acceptance of norms according to which feelings
such as anger and guilt would be appropriate.
All these theories have been broadly classified
as expressivist.
Those who say that moral judgments are
affect-laden and truth-apt need not deny that
moral judgments are expressive, but they insist
that they more than express feelings; they as-
sert facts. If so, moral judgments can be true or
false. Subjectivism falls into this camp:
Subjectivism  =Df the  truth  of  the  judg-
ment that  something is  morally good or
bad depends on the feelings or other sub-
jective states of someone who makes that
judgment.
For instance, one might propose that “killing is
wrong”  means  “I  disapprove  of  killing.”  That
judgment is true, if the speaker disapproves of
killing, and false otherwise. As we will see, there
are also more sophisticated forms of subjectiv-
ism. Subjectivists are internalist moral realists:
they believe in moral facts, but they deny that
those  facts  obtain  independently  of  our  atti-
tudes. 
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The term “cognitivism” has been used to
refer to any view on which moral judgments are
truth-apt, which is to say they can be assessed
for truth. Expressivists are non-cognitivists, and
both  subjectivists  and  external  moral  realists
are cognitivists. One could also have a cognitiv-
ist theory and nevertheless insist that all moral
judgments are false. This would be an error the-
ory. 
Error  theory  =Df Moral  judgments  are
truth-apt, but they are never true.
The most famous error theory comes from J. L.
Mackie.  Mackie  argues  that  moral  judgments
are incoherent. On the one hand, they presup-
pose that moral facts are objective, which is to
say  mind-independent.  On  the  other  hand,
moral  judgments  presuppose  that  moral  facts
are action guiding, and that suggests that they
directly motivate us. This suggests that moral
judgments  must  be  affect-laden,  or  otherwise
dependent on our subjective states. Since noth-
ing can be both objective and subjective, moral
judgments can never be true. Opponents of the
error  theory  deny  this  and  insist  that  some
moral  judgments  are  true.  They  are,  in  this
sense,  moral  realists.  Moral  realists  who  also
claim  that  moral  judgments  are  affect-laden
must take Mackie’s challenge head on, showing
that truth is compatible with being action-guid-
ing.
Such sentimentalist realists face an imme-
diate question. They can accept Mackie’s claim
that moral judgments represent objective prop-
erties, and find some way to circumvent the in-
coherence, or they could say that moral judg-
ments refer to properties that are subjective, or
response-dependent.  The  first  option  might
seem  untenable,  since  it  accepts  that  moral
judgments are both objective and subjective, an
apparent  contradiction.  But  the  contradiction
can  be  mitigated  by  distinguishing  between
sense and reference. One might say that moral
concepts  have  affect-laden senses—that  is,  we
grasp them by means of feeling—and objective
referents. Consider, for example, Kant’s aesthet-
ics, according to which beauty consists in a kind
of purposeful purposelessness that causes a free-
play of the understanding, which results in aes-
thetic  pleasure.  A work  may  have  purposeful
purposelessness  without  our  recognizing  that
this is so, but when we recognize it, we feel a
certain way.  Within ethics,  Francis  Hutcheson
may have held a view that was objectivist and
subjectivist in just this way. He suggests that
moral facts are established by divine command,
but God has furnished us with a moral sense,
and that sense works by means of the emotions;
when we see objectively bad actions, we feel dis-
approbation. This has been called a moral sense
theory, because it treats our moral passions as a
kind of sensory capacity that picks up on real
moral facts.
In contrast to this view, one might argue
that  moral  facts  are not  objective,  as  Mackie
has  maintained,  but  rather  are  dependent  on
our responses. This need not imply that moral
judgments are mere expressions of feeling; one
might say instead that moral judgments refer to
response-dependent properties. The idea of re-
sponse-dependent properties derives from John
Locke’s notion of secondary qualities. Primary
qualities, such as shape, for Locke, exist inde-
pendently of  being perceived, whereas second-
ary qualities consist in the power that certain
things have to cause responses in us. Colors, for
Locke, are not out there in the world, but con-
sist in the fact that objects cause certain sensa-
tions in us. The moral analogue of this view has
been called the sensibility theory, and its adher-
ents  include  John  McDowell,  David  Wiggins,
and David McNaughton. They resist the causal
language found in Locke’s theory of colors, but
say something close: 
Sensibility theory =Df moral properties are
those that warrant moral emotions. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  sensibility  theory  is  a
form of  subjectivism, since it says that moral
judgments  refer  to  subjective  properties  (the
property of warranting moral emotions), but the
notion of warrant allows these theorists to avoid
a pitfall  or  simple  subjectivism.  For  a simple
subjectivist  it  makes  no  sense  to  wonder
whether something that I disapprove of is really
wrong, but for the sensibility theories I can en-
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tertain  such  doubt  because  I  can  wonder
whether an event really warrants what I happen
to feel. The notion of warrant here is not un-
problematic,  and  it  often  goes  unanalyzed.
There  is  one  notable  exception,  however,  and
that  is  the ideal  observer  theory (Firth 1952;
Brandt 1959): 
Ideal  observer  theory  =Df The  morally
good  or  bad  is  that  which  an  observer
would regard as good or bad under ideal
circumstances. 
Such circumstances might involve acquiring the
status of a moral sage (or consulting a moral
sage), as on some virtue theoretic theories, or
an ideal version of myself  (Smith 1994). Ideal
observer  theorists  are  committed  to  response-
dependence; they say that responses determine
moral truth, and they further require that those
responses come from certain kinds of epistemic
agents.
Ideal observer theories offer a negative an-
swer to the final question in the metaethics de-
cision tree. They specify conditions of ideal ob-
servation in order to find an authoritative set of
responses among a diversity of moral opinions.
The  hope  is  that  one  set  of  judgments  will
emerge as epistemically superior to all  others;
on this view, all moral judges converge under
ideal conditions. Here, moral truths work out to
be universal. This, of course, is a controversial
claim.  Suppose  we  define  ideal  observers  as
those who are free from bias, aware of pertinent
non-moral  facts,  and  reasoning  carefully.  It
could turn out that, two such observers could
still disagree on moral matters. This prognosis
leads toward the view that there is no way to
arrive  at  moral  consensus.  Those  who  think
that  moral  judgments  are rendered true by a
judge’s response but deny consensus under op-
timal epistemic conditions end up saying that
moral judgments are relative. This view can be
stated as follows:
Metaethical relativism =Df Two judgments
expressed using tokens of the same word
types, and grasped by tokens of the same
mental  attitude  types  can  have  different
truth-values if they are made by different
observers. 
I will now try to show that each question on the
decision  tree  can  be  empirically  illuminated.
Some of the empirical results that I will present
come from unpublished, exploratory studies. My
goal here is not a detailed documentation of sci-
entific  findings,  but  rather  to  establish,  by
means  of  example,  ways  in  which  empirical
methods might be brought to bear on the fore-
going questions.  The hope is that the studies
described here might be taken up by others and
improved upon.
2 Empirical resolutions to metaethical 
debates 
2.1 Sentimentalism vs. rationalism and 
externalism
Let’s  begin  with  the  first  question  on  the
metaethics  decision  tree:  are moral  judgments
affect-laden? No question in ethics has received
more empirical attention than this.  Dozens of
studies  have  attempted  to  determine  whether
emotions play a central role in morality, and the
evidence has consistently shown that they do.
Let me begin with an unpublished study of my
own and then offer a brief review of the empir-
ical literature.
To  begin  with,  let’s  consider  folk  intu-
itions. Do ordinary people use emotions as evid-
ence when attributing moral judgments? To test
this, I conducted a simple vignette study, which
pitted  emotions  against  verbal  testimony.  A
group of college undergraduates taking an intro-
ductory-level philosophy class responded to the
following probe:
Fred belongs to a fraternity and his brothers
in  the  fraternity  sometimes  smoke  marijuana.
Fred insists that he thinks it’s morally acceptable
to smoke marijuana. He says, “You guys are not
doing anything wrong when you smoke.” But Fred
also feels disgusted with his frat brothers when he
sees them smoking. One day, to prove that he
thinks smoking is okay, he smokes marijuana him-
self.  Afterwards,  he  feels  incredibly  ashamed
about smoking the drug.
Prinz, J. (2015). Naturalizing Metaethics.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 30(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570511 9 | 27
www.open-mind.net
Which of the following seems more likely:
1. Fred says he morally approves of marijuana
smoking, but in reality he thinks it is morally
wrong.
2. Fred  feels  badly  about  smoking  marijuana,
but in reality he thinks it is morally accept-
able.
In my small sample, 68.4% chose answer 1, sug-
gesting that the majority of them take emotions
as  evidence for  moral  values,  even when that
directly  contradicts  self-report.  This  suggests
that many people take emotions to be a suffi-
cient  evidence for  attribution moral  attitudes.
An  even  more  dramatic  result  was  obtained
when another twenty participants assessed this
scenario:
Frank  belongs  to  a  fraternity  and  his
brothers  in  the  fraternity  sometimes  smoke
marijuana. Frank insists that their actions are
morally unacceptable. He says, “You guys are
doing something wrong when you smoke.” But
Frank does not feel any anger or disgust when
he  sees  his  frat  brothers  smoking.  One  day,
when they are not around, he smokes marijuana
himself. Afterwards, he doesn’t feel any shame
about smoking the drug.
Which of the following seems more likely:
1. Frank  says  he  morally  opposes  marijuana
smoking, but in reality he thinks it is morally
acceptable.
2. Frank  doesn’t  feel  badly  about  smoking
marijuana, but in reality he thinks it is mor-
ally wrong.
Here, 89.5% of participants chose response 1, in-
dicating that they take emotions to be neces-
sary for the attribution of moral attitudes. Ab-
sent  the  right  feelings,  verbal  testimony  is
treated as an unreliable indicator of a person’s
values.
This study has at least four serious limita-
tions: people may not trust self-reports; the res-
ults were far from unanimous; it fails to distin-
guish evidence for moral attitudes and essence
of moral attitudes; and folk beliefs about moral
judgments may be wrong. To get around these
limitations we must move beyond experimental
philosophy,  and look for more direct  evidence
that emotions actually are sufficient and neces-
sary for moral judgments. But the study is still
revealing,  because  it  shows that  emotions  are
used as evidence in moral attribution. Most par-
ticipants make attributions that fall in line with
sentimentalism.
To show that  emotions  actually  do  con-
tribute to moral cognition, we can look at three
kinds of evidence: cognitive neuroscience, beha-
vioral  psychology,  and pathology.  In  each  do-
main, sentimentalism finds support. There have
now  been  dozens  of  neuroimaging  studies  on
moral judgment tasks, and every one of them,
to my knowledge, shows an increase in activa-
tion  in  brain  structures  associated  with  emo-
tion,  when  moral  decisions  are  compared  to
non-moral decisions. Key stuctures include the
posterior cingulate, temporal pole, orbitofrontal
cortex,  and  ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex.
There are only two groups of studies that even
appear  to  depart  from  this  pattern.  Joshua
Greene et al. (2001) report that emotions play
more of a role in deontological judgments than
in  consequentialist  judgments,  but  their  data
show  that,  as  compared  to  non-moral  judg-
ments, emotions are involved in both (see their
Figure 1). Moreover, Greene et al. use moral di-
lemmas in  which the common denominator is
saving lives—they manipulate the nature of the
harm necessary in order to save five people in
danger.  Thus,  each  moral  judgment  condition
presumably elicits the judgment that it would
be good to help people in need. This positive
moral judgment may be emotionally grounded,
but  the  neuroimaging  method  subtracts  away
this emotional information, because it is present
in  each  scenario,  and  imaging  results  of  this
kind  report  only  contrasts  between  different
conditions.  Thus, a major dimension of  moral
emotions  may  be  systematically  concealed  by
the method. The other study that fails to show
an increase in emotional responses during moral
judgment is one condition in a series of imagin-
ing experiments performed by Jana Borg et al.
(2006). But, in that condition, a moral scenario
is compared to a scenario about an encroaching
fire that threatens one’s property, and it is un-
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surprising that moral judgments produce less of
an emotional response than a case of personal
loss.
Brain  science  resoundingly  links  moral
judgment to emotion, but the method is correl-
ational.  Moral  rationalists  and  externalists
could concede that moral judgments excite emo-
tional responses,  while denying that these are
the basis of moral judgment. Imagine the fol-
lowing view: we use reason to arrive at moral
judgments, but morality matters to us, so when
we arrive at those judgments emotions normally
kick in. By analogy, reason might be used to de-
termine  that  certain  life  activities  (smoking,
high fat  diets,  sleep deprivation)  are harmful,
and,  upon  drawing  that  reason-based  conclu-
sion, we tend to experience corresponding emo-
tions, such as anxiety when contemplating light-
ing  a  cigarette.  Neuroimaging  results  showing
responses  to  cigarettes  might  confirm  this,
showing  emotion  areas  active  when  cigarettes
are seen, but that wouldn’t refute a rationalist
theory of how we arrive at the judgment that
cigarettes are dangerous.
To  adjudicate  between  the  thesis  that
emotions are constitutive of  moral  judgments,
as opposed to mere consequences, we need be-
havioral evidence. Numerous studies now estab-
lish a causal link between emotion and moral
judgment. When emotions are induced, they in-
fluence how good or bad things seem. Induction
methods  have  been  widely  varied:  hypnosis,
dirt,  film  clips,  autobiographical  recall,  and
smells. In one recent study, Kendal Eskine, Nat-
alie Kacinik, and I induced bitterness by giving
people a bitter beverage and found that moral
judgments  became more  severe  (Eskine et  al.
2011).  In other  recent studies  Angelika Seidel
and I use sound clips to induce specific emo-
tions,  and we have shown that different emo-
tions have different moral effects: anger induces
more  stringent  wrongness  judgments  about
crimes against persons; disgust induces greater
stringency  on  crimes  against  nature  (such  as
cannibalism);  and  happiness  induces  stronger
judgments that it is both good and compulsory
to  help  the  needy  (Seidel &  Prinz 2013a,
2013b). There is also evidence that we feel dif-
ferent emotions when judging our own actions
than when judging others. When another per-
son commits a crime against nature, we tend to
feel  disgust,  but  when  we  perform  an  act
deemed  by  others  to  be  unnatural,  the  most
common  response  seems  to  be  shame.  Con-
versely, when others commit crimes against per-
sons, we feel angry, but guilt is the natural re-
sponse when we perform such acts ourselves. To
test this hypothesis, I conducted a forced-choice
study in which a group of college undergradu-
ates had to pick guilt or shame in response to
mildly “unnatural” acts (“Suppose your room-
mate  catches  you  masturbating”),  and  mildly
harmful  acts  (“Suppose  you  take  something
from someone and never return it”). 80% chose
shame for the first case, and over 90% picked
guilt for the second.
Such findings demonstrate that different
emotions  play  different  roles.  I  mentioned
three distinctions that are currently receiving
empirical attention: the split between positive
and  negative  emotions  (praise  and  blame),
between  two  kinds  of  blame  (crimes  against
nature  and  crimes  against  persons),  and
between  self-  and  other-directed  blame.  The
self/other distinction may be particularly im-
portant  because  it  helps  us  see  how  moral
emotions  differ  from  their  non-moral  ana-
logues. Anger (or at least irritation) and dis-
gust  can  both  occur  in  non-moral  contexts,
but they take on a moral cast, I submit, when
paired  with  dispositions  to  feel  guilt  and
shame,  respectively.  If  I  find  eating  insects
physically revolting, I will experience disgust
when  I  see  others  eat  insects,  and  disgust
when I inadvertently eat them myself. But if I
found insect eating immoral, it would not be
disgust  that  I  experience  in  the  first-person
case, but shame. This feeling of shame would
motivate me to make amends for my actions,
or to conceal my wrongdoing from others, not
simply to repel  the  unwanted food from my
body.  The  self-directed  emotions  round  out
the punitive cast of  our moral attitudes.  We
see  morally  bad  acts  as  not  just  worth  ag-
gressing  against,  but  as  worthy  of  apology.
This need not be a second-order belief. Rather
it is implicit in the fact that moralized behavi-
ors  carry  emotional  dispositions  toward  self
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and  other  that  together  promote  a  punitive
attitude: a disposition to issue and submit to
punishment.
Putting  this  together,  I  propose  that
standing moral values (the values that a given
individual has for an extended period of time)
consist  in  dispositions  to  feel  the  self-  and
other-directed  emotions  that  I  have  been  dis-
cussing. Such an emotional disposition can be
called a sentiment. On any given occasion when
a standing value becomes active in thought—
i.e., when a moral judgment is made—these dis-
positions result, all else being equal, in an emo-
tional state. The emotion that is felt depends
on who is doing what to whom. For example, if
I  recall a situation in which I hurt someone’s
feelings, I will have a feeling of guilt regarding
that event, because a person was harmed and I
was the culprit. This feeling of guilt toward an
event constitutes my judgment that the action
was wrong,  and I gain introspective access to
this judgment by feeling guilt well up inside me.
If this is right, then emotions are not merely ef-
fects of moral judgments, but essential compon-
ents of them. 
Against this picture, one might object that
emotions  are  merely  a  heuristic  that  can  be
used in certain circumstances, but not strictly
necessary for making moral judgment. Following
the analogy mentioned before, anxiety might be
used as a heuristic  when deciding whether  to
smoke, but the judgment that smoking is dan-
gerous does not depend on fear,  and was ini-
tially arrived at by the light of reason.
To establish that emotions are not merely
helpful heuristics, one must see what happens
when emotions  are  reduced or  eliminated.  To
look into  this,  Eskine (2011)  gave  people  the
bitter  taste  manipulation  and  then  warned
them  not  to  let  the  feelings  caused  by  that
beverage interfere with the moral judgments. In
this condition, he found that moral judgments
were considerably less severe than a control con-
dition,  suggesting  that,  when  we  ignore  emo-
tions, it is harder to see things as wrong. The
finding  indicates,  in  other  words,  that  moral
judgments  subside  when emotions  are  absent.
The  study  cannot  confirm  this  strong  claim,
however, because people cannot suppress emo-
tions completely. More powerful evidence comes
from the clinical  populations  who suffer  from
emotional  deficits.  For  example,  psychopaths,
who suffer from deficit in guilt and other negat-
ive emotions, notoriously fail to appreciate what
is wrong with their actions (Hare 1993). Simil-
arly,  people  with  Huntington’s  disease,  which
impairs  disgust,  show  high  incidence  of
paraphelias,  suggesting that they cease to see
deviant sexual behavior as wrong (Schmidt &
Bonelli 2008).  Kramer (1993,  p.  278)  argues
that anti-depressants can flatten affect in a way
that  results  in  a  “loss  of  moral  sensibility.”
There  is  also  a  positive  relationship  between
alexithymia  and  Machiavellianism,  suggesting
that a reduction in emotional competence may
act  in  ways  that  are  more  instrumental  than
moral  (Wastell &  Booth 2003).  For  better  or
worse, there is no clinical condition in which all
emotions are absent and behavioral function re-
mains, but these findings suggest that selective
or global dampening of the emotions leads to
corresponding deficits in moral judgment. That
is, people with diminished emotions seem to be
insensitive to corresponding parts of the moral
domain, suggesting that they may not be form-
ing moral judgments.
The  evidence  summarized  here  suggests
that emotions arise when we make moral judg-
ments,  that  emotions  are  consulted  when  re-
porting such judgments, and that moral judg-
ments are impaired when emotions are unavail-
able. Some of this evidence is preliminary, but,
for present purposes, let’s assume that the find-
ings hold up to further and more stringent test-
ing. By inference to the best explanation, such
findings suggest that emotions are components
of  moral  judgments.  The  idea  is  that,  when
people  say  something  is  morally  bad,  the
thought  they  are  expressing  on  that  occasion
consists of a negative emotion directed towards
the thing judged bad. Emotions, on this view,
function  like  predicates  in  thought.  That  is
what  traditionally  sentimentalists,  such  as
Hume, seem to have maintained. Hume thought
ideas—the  components  of  thoughts—were
stored  copies  of  impressions,  and  the  idea  of
moral badness consisted in a stored copy of the
impression of disapprobation. 
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Traditional  sentimentalism,  which  says
that emotions (or sentiments) are actually com-
ponents  of  moral  judgments,  differs  conspicu-
ously  from neo-sentimentalism.  Neo-sentiment-
alists  theories  say  that  moral  judgments  are
judgments  about  the  appropriateness  of  emo-
tions.  These  theories  do not  straightforwardly
predict  that  emotions  come  on  line  when  we
make moral judgments, nor that a reduction in
emotions  should  interfere  with  our  ability  to
moralize. Instead, they predict that people will
think  about  emotions  when  they  make  moral
judgments. Correlatively, they also predict that
people with limited metacognitive abilities will
lose their ability to make moral judgments; this
is not the case (Nichols 2008). Thus, given the
current state of evidence, traditional sentiment-
alism outperforms  neo-sentimentalism empiric-
ally.  Traditional  sentimentalism predicts  a  ro-
bust pattern of empirical findings.
Rationalists and externalist moral realists
might baulk at this point and say that the em-
pirical  evidence  lacks  the  adequate  modal
strength to support sentimentalism. The evid-
ence  shows that  emotions  are often  consulted
when making moral judgments, but this leaves
open the possibility that  we might  also  make
moral judgments dispassionately under circum-
stances that have not yet been empirically ex-
plored. So stated, this objection is just an ex-
pression of faith. It suffers from both conceptual
and empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, oppon-
ents  of  sentimentalism  must  say  what  moral
judgments are, such that they can be had dis-
passionately.  What  thought  is  a  dispassionate
person conveying, when she says,  “Killing the
innocent is morally bad?” Any attempt to give
a reductive answer will be vulnerable to open-
question worries.  No descriptive substitute for
the phrase “morally bad” leaves us with a sen-
tence that is conceptually synonymous with the
third. 
Arguably,  the  open-question  argument
does not threaten sentimentalism. Let’s distin-
guish two kinds of open questions. First, given a
certain  attitude  towards  killing,  one  can  still
wonder  whether  killing  really  is  morally  bad.
Second, given a certain attitude toward killing,
one can wonder whether one is thereby regard-
ing  it  as  morally  bad.  Reductive  theories  of
value leave both questions open. If I form the
attitude that killing cannot be willed as a uni-
versal  law,  I  can  still  wonder  both  whether
killing is bad and whether I am judging that it
is bad. Sentimentalism leaves the first question
open,  but  not the second.  When experiencing
outrage at killing, it seems impossible to wonder
I am regarding killing as bad. I can of course
wonder  whether  killing  really  is  as  bad  as  it
seems. Such doubts can arise because I may not
know the true source of the emotion I am feel-
ing. Perhaps my outrage comes from some ex-
traneous source (such as a bitter beverage), for
example.  But  this  open  question  does  not
threaten  the  thesis  that  moral  judgments  are
constituted by sentiments. The only open ques-
tion  that  poses  such  a  threat  would  be  one
about  what  my  attitude  is,  not  one  about
whether my attitude is true. The fact that some
sentiments are experienced as condemnatory ef-
fectively  closes  the  question  about  whether
someone experiencing those sentiments is adopt-
ing a moral stance. By analogy, imagine tasting
a wine and wondering whether it really is deli-
cious, while experiencing gustatory pleasure. We
can have this thought (a thought about truth),
because  we  can’t  be  sure  where  the  pleasure
came from (was it the wine or the company?).
But we can’t experience gustatory pleasure and
wonder whether we are, at that moment, find-
ing  the  experience  delicious.  Thus,  gustatory
pleasure is plausible a component of delicious-
ness judgments. 
The foregoing may look like a conceptual
argument for sentimentalism. But it can also be
construed as an empirical claim. The argument
hangs on the premise that people experiencing
outrage  take  themselves  to  be  making  moral
judgments. This can be empirically tested. In-
deed, all the evidence about people consulting
their  emotions when making moral  judgments
stands  as  evidential  support.  Merely  making
someone mad results in more negative moral at-
titudes.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  showing
that, when people are angry, there is no ques-
tion for them about whether they are holding
something in negative moral regard. Conversely,
it would be easy to show that people do not ne-
Prinz, J. (2015). Naturalizing Metaethics.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 30(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570511 13 | 27
www.open-mind.net
cessarily draw this inference when they form the
judgment that something cannot be willed as a
universal law. Opponents of sentimentalism owe
us  a  positive  account  of  evaluative  thoughts
that  avoids  open-question  worries  as  success-
fully as sentimentalist accounts. 
Opponents of sentimentalism might try to
bypass this demand by offering a non-reductive
account of moral judgments, treating thin moral
concepts as primitives.  That possibility,  which
was  attractive  to  Moore,  looks  unmotivated
given the empirical  evidence for  an emotional
foundation. Every study suggests that emotions
arise when we make moral judgments. All evid-
ence also suggests that when emotions are elim-
inated, judgments subside as well. This does not
prove  that  we  can  make  moral  judgments
without emotions, but, by induction, it provides
evidence. Some have argued that extant evid-
ence is ambiguous about whether emotions are
essental  components  of  moral  judgments  or
mere  accompaniments,  but  I  have  suggested
here that the former may provide a better ex-
planation (and certainly better predictions) of
the total pattern of data (Huebner et al. 2009;
Waldmann et al. 2012). Until opponents of sen-
timentalism  can  identify  some  clear  cases  of
moral judgments without emotions, they will be
on the losing side  of  the debate.  At the mo-
ment, there is no empirical evidence that this
ever happens.
Notice too, that it would be relatively un-
interesting to show that, under as-yet-unidenti-
fied and highly unusual conditions, people can
make what look like moral judgments in the ab-
sence of emotions. The sentimentalist will reply
that the vast majority of ordinary moral judg-
ments are emotionally based. If moral vocabu-
lary is occasionally used dispassionately, senti-
mentalists  can  ask  whether  the  thoughts  ex-
pressed on such occasions are of the same kind
that we find, in study after study, in the usual
cases.  Upon  finding  a  class  of  dispassionate
judgments, one might do best to posit an ambi-
guity  in  the  category.  The  sentimentalist  can
content herself with the project of providing a
metaethics for garden-variety moral judgments,
while  leaving  open  the  possibility  that  there
may be psychological exotica, which conform to
the theories of their opponents. At the moment,
there is no empirical evidence for such exotica.
More  modestly,  the  empirically-minded
sentimentalist  might  welcome  an  attempt  to
find evidence for  opposing views.  Little  effort
has been put into this task, though empirical
claims for emotion-free moralizing are occasion-
ally advanced. The most publicized example is
Koenigs et al.’s (2007) study, which shows intact
consequentialist judgments in patients who suf-
fer from ventromedial prefrontal brain injuries,
which are thought to impair emotion. But this
description is misleading. As the authors note,
ventromedial patients are highly emotional, and
their most notorious symptom is that they are
insensitive to costs when seeking rewards. Pre-
sumably,  reward-  seeking  is  an  affectively
grounded behavior. The fact that these patients
make  normal  consequentialist  judgments  does
not entail that they rely on reason alone, but
rather  on their  positive  emotions.  Since  these
emotions cannot be easily regulated by negative
feedback in ventromedial patients, they tend to
be more consequentialist than healthy popula-
tions—that is, they are more willing to push a
heavy man in a trolley’s path in order to save
five. 
Will better empirical evidence for rational-
ism or externalist  moral  realism be forthcom-
ing? I doubt it. Rationalists hold that we can
arrive  at  moral  judgments  through  reasoning.
Unlike some sentimentalists, I think reasoning is
important to morality. It is likely that we use
reasoning  to  extrapolate  from basic  values  to
novel cases. But it is unlikely that we could use
reasoning to derive basic  moral  values.  Philo-
sophers have tried to do this for centuries with
no consensus behind any view. This might be
described as a strong empirical argument by in-
duction: thousands of smart, trained moral ex-
perts have failed to identify a line of reasoning
that is widely recognized as providing adequate
rational  support  for  basic  moral  propositions.
Moreover,  when  moral  debates  arise,  there  is
little  evidence that reasoning is  efficacious on
its own. Instead, societal transformations in val-
ues seem to arrive with political upheavals, eco-
nomic revolutions, and generational change. At-
titudes towards slavery changed with the indus-
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trial revolution, women’s suffrage came with a
world  war,  and  increase  in  support  for  gay
rights correlates with the dissolution of  tradi-
tional social roles and economic transformations
that  have  made procreation more  costly  than
abstinence. I don’t mean to imply that there are
no rational arguments for these liberation move-
ments. Rather, I am suggesting that those argu-
ments take hold only when social conditions are
right.  It  is  noteworthy,  for  example,  that  sci-
entific racism appeared very late in the history
of  slavery,  suggesting  that  slavery  was  not
simply  based  on  false  beliefs  about  racial  in-
equality.  In fact  many societies  have enslaved
their own people, and many proponents of sci-
entific racism have been against slavery. Rather,
advocacy of slavery seems to reflect a set of ba-
sic moral values that changed in recent history:
values that say social standing can be determ-
ined by the lottery of birth. With industrializa-
tion, models of labor based on the idea of self-
determination  took  hold,  and  the  idea  that
birth should determine social standing began to
wane.  Of  course,  it  hasn’t  disappeared  alto-
gether,  but  it  has  been  tempered  by the  the
emergence of a new norm. Before industrializa-
tion, the idea that human beings are born equal
and  free  might  have  seemed  manifestly  false,
and thus it could have played no effective role
in any argument against slavery. With industri-
alization,  this  premise gained appeal,  and be-
came the foundation of compelling arguments.
Arguments are not inert, but they are only as
good as the premises on which they are based,
and the plausibility of those premises may de-
pend on factors other than reasonging. It is pos-
sible that reasons have little role in driving ba-
sic values. And if so, then the recent broadening
moral umbrella is not the result of a rational in-
ference to the conclusion that our basic values
cover more cases than we thought, but rather
an irrational shift in basic values.
A realist might concede that such considera-
tions threaten rationalism, but vie instead for a
kind  of  intuitionist  perspective,  according  to
which basic moral truths are simply obvious. To
me, this looks like a magical moral epistemology
—one wonders what moral facts could be such
that  our  moral  sense  could  simply  lock  on  to
them. It is also open to a damaging empirical ob-
jection. Phenomenologically, it is true that moral
intuitions  often  seem immediate  and unbidden,
but this can be readily explained on a sentiment-
alist account. Emotions are conditioned (by train-
ing or evolution) to arise automatically and often
intensely when certain actions, such as torturing
babies, are considered. This gives an impression of
immediacy without postulating any special con-
tact with moral reality. Moreover, these intuitions
vary from group to group. For example, there is
empirical evidence that liberals and conservatives
have divergent basic values (Graham et al. 2009).
The presence of such foundational intuitions can
be explained demographically, and their lack of
convergence  casts  doubt  on  the  existence  of  a
moral faculty that reveals universal moral truths.
In other words, intuitionism is vulnerable to a de-
bunking  argument.  Social  science  coupled  with
sentimentalism  provides  a  good  explanation  of
deeply-held intuitions, so there is no need to sup-
pose that these intuitions reflect anything deeper.
This point about moral variation, to which I
will return, also counts against some forms of ex-
ternalist moral realism. Advocates of that posi-
tion sometimes suggest that objective moral facts
can  be  established  by  identifying  the  external
factors that best explain human moral behavior
or judgments. If moral behavior and judgments
vary from group to group, however, it is unlikely
that we will find an external common denomin-
ator underlying these practices. Such a search also
seems  unnecessary  given  that  we  already  have
good explanations of  moral behavior and judg-
ments in terms of socially-conditioned sentiments.
None of these arguments are the nail in the
coffin for externalist realist or rationalist theories.
They merely illustrate the relevance of empirical
results. The findings mentioned here must be ex-
plained. It is my contention that sentimentalism
provides the best  explanation of  the findings I
have reviewed, but further arguments and evid-
ence could tip the balance in another direction. 
2.2 Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism
Let’s  move on to the second question on the
metaethics decision tree: Are moral judgments
truth-apt? As positioned on the tree, this is a
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question  that  arises  for  sentimentalists,  raised
pressingly  by the conclusion  that  moral  judg-
ments have a basis in the emotions. It is that
conclusion that seems to put truth-aptness in
jeopardy, since emotions have not traditionally
been regarded as having accuracy conditions in
the way regarded as allowing for truth. But, it
should be noted that the question of truth-apt-
ness could also be raised independently of senti-
mentalism. There are non-sentimentalist theor-
ies  that  deny truth-aptness  (for  example,  one
might say that moral judgments are imperative,
while  denying  that  they  need  be  passionate),
and there are non-sentimentalist  theories  that
accept truth-aptness (the vast majority fall in
this category). To keep things as neutral as pos-
sible,  I  will  begin by asking whether  there  is
any  empirical  evidence  that  moral  judgments
are non-cognitive, whether or not they are af-
fect-laden.
The posing of this question is itself a de-
gree of philosophical progress, because non-cog-
nitivists too rarely reflect on the predictions of
their view. Indeed, the most obvious empirical
prediction fails resoundingly. If moral judgments
do not aim at truth, we might expect them to
have a non-declarative syntactic. For example,
we might expect them to take the form of im-
peratives or exclamations. But they do not. In
every language that I know of, moral judgments
are expressed using declarative sentences, which
should stand as a profound embarrassment to
the theory. Granted, non-cognitivists sometimes
propose  elaborate  logics  to  accommodate  this
fact, but it is surprising that they should have
to do so. One would expect the surface gram-
mar to reflect the non-cognitive form.
To push things further, one might look for
more subtle linguistic evidence in favor of non-
cognitivism.  For example,  some non-cognitivists
assume that moral utterances have the illocution-
ary force of directives, such as orders, requests, or
demands. Directives often occur in speech con-
texts that contain words that play a role in per-
suasion, such as “come!”, “let’s”, or “we encour-
age you…” To empricially test this kind of non-
cognitivism,  Olasov (2011) ingeniously used this
technique for sociolinguistics, called corpus ana-
lysis.  He used a set of  such linguistic elements
that correlate with directive speech, such as those
just  mentioned,  and  he  searched  corpora  of
spoken and written texts for co-variance between
these elements and moral terms. He calls the dir-
ective elements “suasion markers,” and the correl-
ations between these and other linguistic items a
“suasion score.” Non-cognitivism seems to predict
a high suasion score, given the postulated direct-
ive function of moral judgments. This prediction
fails.  Not  only  is  there  no  positive  correlation
between moral vocabulary and suasion markers,
there is actually a negative correlation, which ap-
proaches significance.  This  negative relationship
was observed in seventeen out of nineteen differ-
ent categories of text that he examined. These
results are preliminary—a first foray into empir-
ical ethics—but they provide compelling evidence
that moral discourse is not directive in nature.
Non-cognitivism entails that moral discourse
does not aim to refer to facts in the world. This
carries another linguistic prediction that can be
readily tested. Certainly adverbs are used to in-
dicate a focus on how things are in the world.
These  include  “really,”  “truly,”  and  “actually.”
These words have other uses (“really” can be a
term of emphasis), but they often play a role in
emphasizing the factive nature of  the modified
phrase.  Therefore,  if  non-cognitivism were  true
one might expect these words to rarely be used as
modifiers for moral terms. To test  this,  I  used
Google search engine to search for and note the
frequency  of  three  phrases:  “really  immoral,”
“truly immoral,” and “actually immoral.” To do
this, I needed a baseline, and chose to compare
“immoral” to a word widely believed to designate
a objective feature of the world. I chose “triangu-
lar,”  a  classic  primary  quality,  on  a  Lockean
scheme. The results are as follows (as of March,
2013):
 
“really triangular”: 6,500 hits 
“really immoral”: 10,600 hits
“truly triangular”: 4,920 hits
“truly immoral”: 32,000 hits
“actually triangular”: 21,600 hits
“actually immoral”: 61,600 hits
 
Clearly, the adverbs that indicate a real-world
focus are used more frequently for moral terms
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than  for  terms  designating  objective  physical
features—over six times as common in the case
of “truly.” I also tried the phrases “in truth,”
“truthfully,” and “in actual fact”:
 
“truthfully triangular”: 6 hits
“truthfully immoral”: 44 hits
“in truth triangular”: 46 hits
“in truth immoral”: 1,350 hits
“in actual fact triangular”: 2 hits
“in actual fact immoral”: 133 hits
 
These truth-tracking phrases modify “immoral”
between 7 and 166 times more frequently than
they modify “triangular.” Moreover, these differ-
entials are misleadingly small because the baser-
ate  for  “immoral”  is  far  lower than “triangu-
lar” (6,910,000 hits as compared to 11,600,000).
This was just an exploratory study, but there is
a  simple  implication.  Non-cognitivism  makes
linguistic  predictions,  and  when  those  are
tested, they do not seem to pan out. Non-cog-
nitivists  owe  us  evidence,  or  they  must  deny
that  their  theory makes  predictions,  in  which
case it would cease to be falsifiable.
In response,  non-cognitivists  might  claim
that there is one crucial line of evidence in favor
of the view, and it’s a line of evidence that we
have already seen. In the previous section, I sur-
veyed studies suggesting that morality is affect-
laden. At the start of  this section, I  said the
non-cognitivism is orthogonal to affect-ladeness,
but  some  non-cognitivists  would  vehemently
disagree with this.  They would say that  non-
cognitivism  follows from affect-ladeness.  Emo-
tions are traditionally regarded as feelings, and
feelings are not traditionally believed to be rep-
resentations  of  anything.  If  the  thought  that
killing innocents is wrong is really a bad feeling
about killing, then why think this thought has
any truth conditions? Does a feeling of indiges-
tion or irritation really refer? 
This move might have been compelling in
the early part of the twentieth century, but the
last  fifty  years  of  emotion  research  have  em-
phasized the intentionality of affect. Some philo-
sophers have adopted cognitive theories of the
emotions,  according  to  which  emotions  are
identical to judgments. Elsewhere I have argued
against such theories, in favor of the view that
emotions are bodily feelings (Prinz 2004), but
contemporary  feeling  theorists  still  insist  that
emotions aim to refer. Feeling sad, for example,
can  be  understood  as  a  downtrodden  bodily
state that represents loss. To say that the feel-
ing represents loss is to say that it has the func-
tion of arising in response to losses, and hence
carries  the information that  there has been a
loss to a person who experiences it. In a like
manner, pain may indicate tissue damage and
fatigue  may  indicate  energy  depletion,  even
though  pain  and  fatigue  are  bodily  feelings.
None of these feelings are arbitrary. They pre-
pare an organism to cope with specific condi-
tions or events. Emotions qua feelings are in the
business of keeping us abreast about how we are
faring.  Each  emotion  has  a  different  signific-
ance, and any one of them can misfire. I might
be sad when there is no loss, or frightened when
there is no threat. Such emotions would qualify
as erroneous. 
If emotions are in the business of repres-
enting, then there is no difficulty supposing that
moral judgments are truth-apt.  When we sin-
cerely assert that, “Killing innocents is bad,” we
express a negative feeling towards killing, and
that feeling functions as a kind of visceral pre-
dicate. It attributes a property to killing (I will
have more to say about this property below). In
this  sense,  moral  discourse may be much like
other  forms of  emotional  discourse.  If  we say
that  some  food  is  icky,  we  express  a  feeling,
while also attributing a property. For example,
the feeling of ickiness might represent the prop-
erty of noxiousness, or perhaps something more
subjective,  such  as  the  property  of  causing
nausea in the speaker. Someone who calls some-
thing “icky” need not know what property that
feeling  represents,  but  most  language  users
probably recognize that in using this term we
are  attempting  to  say  something  about
whatever it is that elicits the feeling. By ana-
logy to “icky,” moral assertions can be under-
stood as both expressive and predicative. It is a
mistake, based on overly simplistic theories of
emotions, to assume that feelings cannot play a
semantic function. Once we see that feelings can
represent properties and function as predicates,
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non-cognitivism no longer  looks  like a serious
option.
2.3 Realism vs. the error theory 
It is one thing to say that moral assertions aim
to represent and quite another to say that they
succeed in doing so. It is possible that when we
say that an action is immoral, we aim to ascribe
a property to it, but we do not succeed in doing
so. This is precisely what defenders of the error
theory have  claimed.  So,  even  if  the  forgoing
case for cognitivism succeeds, we must now des-
cend the decision tree and ask whether moral
judgments are ever true. 
The error theory, which states that moral
judgments are truth-apt but always false,  was
first  promulgated  by  J. L. Mackie (1977).
Mackie’s argument begins with the premise that
moral  predicates  aim  to  represent  properties
with  two important  features.  The first  is  ob-
jectivity: moral properties are supposed to be
the kinds of things that can obtain independent
of our beliefs, desires, inclinations, and prefer-
ences. The second is action-guidingness: moral
properties  are  supposed  to  be  the  kinds  of
things that compel us to act when we recognize
them. Mackie’s second premise is that these two
features  are  difficult  to  reconcile.  Objective
properties are usually the kinds of things about
which we can be  indifferent.  Mackie  uses  the
term  “queer”  to  describe  properties  that  are
both objective and action-guiding, and he also
suggests  that  such queer  properties  would re-
quire an odd epistemology. For these reasons, he
thinks we shouldn’t postulate objective action-
guiding  properties.  But,  Mackie  thinks  that
moral concepts commit to the existence of such
properties,  and,  thus,  that  moral  judgments
posit  properties  that  don’t  exist.  Therefore,
moral judgments are systematically false.
In recent years, the error theory has be-
come  popular  among  evolutionary  ethicists
(Ruse 1991; Joyce 2006). Mackie’s theory leaves
us with a puzzle. Why do people make moral
judgments if they are incoherent? Evolutionary
ethicists purport to have an answer. They say
that morality is an illusion that has been natur-
ally selected because it  confers  a survival  ad-
vantage. For example, if we believe that cheat-
ing others is objectively bad and that belief is
action-guiding,  then  we  will  hold  others  ac-
countable when they cheat, and we will resist
cheating even when it might seem advantageous
to  do  so.  This  reduces  the  likelihood  of  free
riders  and  leads  to  an  evolutionarily  stable
strategy—one that can foster cooperation and
collective works. Evolutionary ethicists also typ-
ically  endorse  sentimentalism,  suggesting  that
moral emotions have evolved to motivate such
things as punishment and altruism. Mackie him-
self is not explicit about the role of emotions in
his view, which makes it unclear what he means
when he says that we perceive the discovery of
alleged  moral  facts  to  be  action-guiding.  The
link between judgments and emotions, emphas-
ized by evolutionists, provides one answer.
The  evolutionary  addendum to  Mackie’s
argument may look like an empirical reason for
siding with the error theory. Natural selection is
a  well-confirmed  process,  emotions  have  some
basis in evolution, and evolutionary models con-
firm that emotionally-grounded moral instincts
would be adaptive. But there are empirical reas-
ons for doubting the evolutionary story, and for
doubting  the  key  premises  in  Mackie’s  argu-
ment. Consequently, I think the case for the er-
ror theory fails.
The evidence for an evolved moral sense is
underwhelming. A thorough critique cannot be
undertaken  here,  but  let  me  offer  two  broad
reasons  for  doubt  (for  more  discussion,  see
Prinz 2007a). First, there is little evidence for a
moral  sense  in  closely  related  species.  Recall
that moral judgments are underwritten by emo-
tions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and shame.
There is no evidence that the last three of these
emotions exist  in  chimpanzees,  and the anger
they exhibit might better be described as react-
ive aggression, because there is little reason to
believe  chimps  form  robust  tendencies  to  be
angry about third party offences when they are
not  directly  involved.  Evolutionists  point  out
that chimps engage in reciprocal altruism, and
other forms or prosocial behavior, but these be-
haviors  may  not  depend  on  any  moral  judg-
ments. Indeed, psychopaths engage in reciprocal
altruism (Widom 1976), and chimps often be-
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have in ways that seem psychopathic; they can
be extremely violent (Wrangham 2004) and in-
different  to  each  others  welfare  (Silk et  al.
2005). 
Evolutionary ethicists might concede this
and argue that morality evolved in the human
species after we split from other primates. But
this position is vulnerable to a second objection:
there is good reason to think that morality in
humans is learned. Moral judgments derive from
emotions that originate outside the moral do-
main, such as disgust, which is first applied to
noxious agents and later expended to the social
domain,  through  conditioning  (Prinz 2007a).
Even  guilt  and  shame  may  be  learned
byproducts of non-moral emotions: shame is re-
lated  to  embarrassment  and  guilt  may  be  a
blend of sadness and anxiety brought on by vi-
olating a social norm (Prinz 2005). These emo-
tions and their range of application depend on
extensive conditioning in childhood. Moral vari-
ation across cultures is considerable, as we will
see, and shared moral values can be attributed
to widespread constraints on building a stable
society (for example, stable societies must pro-
hibit  wanton  murder  within  the  in-group).
Moreover,  there  is  no  poverty-of-the-stimulus
argument  for  morality;  children  receive  ample
“negative data” in the form of punishment, and
they directly imitate values in their communit-
ies. As I argue in greater detail elsewhere, argu-
ments for innate moral norms have been uncon-
vincing (Prinz 2007a). This suggests that moral-
ity is learned, not evolved.
If  morality  is  acquired  through  learning,
then one cannot bolster Mackie’s argument by
assuming that morality is the product of evolu-
tion. This alone does not undermine the error
theory, however. Error theorists might abandon
the  evolutionary  approach and try  to  explain
systematic error by appeal to a learning story.
There  is  some  evidence  that  people  tend  to
treat  certain  rules  as  universally  binding,  re-
gardless of operative conventions. When asked
whether it would be okay to hit a classmate if
the teacher granted permission, children tend to
say “no.”  Turiel (1983, Ch. 7) who made this
discovery, denies that such objectivist leanings
are innate. Rather, he thinks children learn to
distinguish moral and conventional rules. Some
subsequent authors have argued that the learn-
ing in question involves emotional conditionism
(Blair 1995;  Nichols 2004).  Moral  rules  are
aquired  through  the  inculcation  of  emotions
such  as  anger,  guilt,  and  shame.  There  are
strong negative feelings associated with hitting
that don’t disappear when children imagine the
teacher saying it is okay to hit. Violating social
conventions may lead to other emotions, such as
embarrassment,  but  these  are  mitigated  when
we move from one social setting to another. For
example,  wearing  a  hat  at  the  dinner  table
might be frowned on in some circumstances, but
not when wearing a birthday hat at a birthday
party. The idea that moral rules are learned by
emotional conditioning could also explain their
motivational impact; emotions impel us to act,
so  emotionally  grounded  rules  seem  to  carry
practical demands. This analysis would explain
both  features  emphasized  by  Mackie—action-
guidingness and objectivity—without assuming
that  moral  rules  actually are  objective.  Thus,
the  error  theory  could  get  off  the  ground
without assuming that morality is a product of
evolution.
On closer scrutiny, however, this argument
is not strong enough to rescue the error theory.
It conflates objectivity with authority independ-
ence.  It  is  true  that  children  think hitting  is
wrong even when it is permitted, but that does
not mean they think moral truths exist  inde-
pendently of subjective responses. Many of our
subjective responses seem independent of what
authorities happen to say—our preferences for
food and music, for example. But we don’t ne-
cessarily infer that these things are objective. So
it is  a further empirical question whether ob-
jectivity is an essential feature of how we under-
stand moral properties.
This brings us to the heart of Mackie’s ar-
gument. Should we grant his first premise that
moral assertions entail objectivity? Empirically,
the answer is a bit messy. When polled, many
people  assume that  morality is  objective,  but
many  reject  this  assumption  (Nichols 2004;
Goodwin &  Darley 2008).  In  survey  studies,
there is a nearly even split between objectivists
and  their  opponents.  Strikingly,  belief  in  ob-
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jectivity  correlates  with  religiosity.  Goodwin
and Darley report that religious beliefs were the
strongest predictor of objectivity that they were
able  to  find.  This  suggests  that  beleif  in  ob-
jectivity is not an essential part of moral com-
petence,  but  is,  rather,  an  explicitly  learned
add-on  that  most  often  comes  with  religious
education. The authors also found that belief in
objectivity goes down in cases of moral issues
about which there is considerable public debate,
such as abortion. This might be interpreted as
showing, again, that objectivity is not a concep-
tual truth about the moral domain, but rather
a negotiable add on, which can be abandoned in
light  of  counter-evidence.  Faith  in  objectivity
goes up with certain relgious beliefs (e.g., divine
command  theory),  and  goes  down  when  con-
fronted  with  the  fact  that  decent,  intelligent
people have very different moral convictions. In
Quine’s  terms,  moral  objectivism,  when  it  is
found,  may  be  collateral  information  rather
than an analytic truth—a belief about morality
that we are willing to revise.
To test this hypothesis, I conducted a sur-
vey study in which I compared a moral predic-
ate (immoral) to two natural kind terms (beetle
and  tuberculosis),  which  paradigmatically  aim
to  designate  objective  properties,  and  to  two
terms that are often said to represent secondary
qualities  (red and  humorous).  If  natural  kind
terms have a presumption of  objectivity, then
any  threat  to  that  presumption  should  lead
people to conclude that those terms don’t refer.
Things are a little trickier with terms such as
red and  humorous:  many  people  believe  that
they designate objective properties, but are will-
ing to give up this assumption when presented
with  countervailing  evidence.  When  told  that
there is no unifying essence to humor, people do
not conclude that nothing is funny; they con-
clude that humorousness is a property that de-
pends  on  our  responses.  In  other  words,  ob-
jectivity is not analytically entailed by  humor-
ous or red. It is collateral information. My study
was  designed  to  see  if  immoral followed  this
same pattern.
A  group  of  college  undergraduates  read
the  following  vignette  for  the  immoral case,
with comparable vignettes for the other terms:
Suppose scientists discover that there are
two kinds of  things that  people  call  im-
moral.  Would  it  be  better  to  say:
(a) The term “immoral” is misleading, and
it might be better to replace it with two
terms corresponding to the two kinds of
cases.  
Or
(b) The fact that there are different cases
is interesting, but doesn’t affect the word.
The fact that we react the same way to
these  two  things  is  sufficient  for  saying
they are both members of the same cat-
egory; they are both immoral.
When given these options, 75% chose option (b)
for  immoral, resisting the first option which is
tantamount to an error theory. Exactly as many
chose option (b) for red, and a few more picked
(b)  for  humorous (90%).  In  contrast,  (a)  was
the dominant answer for the natural kind terms,
tuberculosis and  beetles (55% and 65% respect-
ively).  This suggests that people do not treat
moral  terms the  way that  they  treat  natural
kind  terms.  Even  if  many  people  happen  to
think that morality is objective (as the studies
by Nichols 2004, and Goodwin & Darley 2008,
suggest), they are willing to give up on this be-
lief  without  abandoning  their  moral  concepts.
They are willing to treat those concepts as re-
sponse-dependent.
I  think  these  results  can  be  best  inter-
preted  as  follows.  Moral  concepts  are  neutral
about  moral  objectivity.  People  can  acquire
these concepts without any beliefs about what
kinds of properties they designate. This neutral-
ity begets a kind of resistance to error. If there
are  no  objective  moral  properties,  then  it
wouldn’t  follow  that  moral  judgments  fail  to
refer; it would mean only that they refer to re-
sponse-dependent properties. Thus, it is all but
guaranteed  that  some  moral  judgments  will
come out true, and to this extent the evidence
favors moral realism (defined as the view that
there  are  truthmakers  for  some  moral  judg-
ments). Mackie mistakes a popular but dispens-
able belief about morality for an analytic truth.
His error theory rests on an error. In fact, his
argument for the error theory may rest on two
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mistakes, the second of which we will come to
presently. Of course, this is just one study, and
other  interpretations  may be  available,  but  it
provides  some  evidence  against  Mackie’s  con-
ceptual claim and shows how empirical findings
might  be  used  to  explore  whether  moralizers
are, as he suggests, committed to objectivism.
Extant empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
2.4 Sensibility vs. moral sense
The survey study just described suggests that
one can possess moral concepts without know-
ing whether moral judgments refer to properties
that are objective. The survey also brings out
the possibility that people are willing to accept
the conclusion that moral truth depends on our
responses.  But  the  survey  does  not  settle
whether  a  response-dependent  theory  is  true.
This is the next question on the decision tree.
As we have seen, Mackie thinks action-guiding-
ness and objectivity are incompatible. This may
suggest that he sees no room for a theory that
combines moral objectivity with the view that
moral judgments have motivational pull.  This,
however, is Mackie’s second mistake. The hypo-
thesis that morality has an emotional basis re-
veals a way out of  Mackie’s  argument for in-
compatibility.  Emotions  are  action-guiding  in
that they motivate us to act. But some emo-
tions  may also  represent  objective  features  of
the  world.  Fear,  for  example,  may  represent
danger, and danger may be an objective prop-
erty. Emotions can represent objective proper-
ties  in  a motivating way: they simultaneously
pick up on information while compelling us to
respond adaptively. The fact that fear is action-
guiding does not rule out the possibility that it
is  designed  by  evolution  to  track  objective
threats. Likewise, disgust is action-guiding but
it may register real sources of contamination.
This brings us back to “icky.” This emo-
tionally-expressive term may refer to something
objective,  like contamination,  or  to  something
subjective, such as the tendency to cause feel-
ings of nausea. We can ask whether ickiness is
objective or subjective, even if we grant that the
word “icky” is expressive. Expressive terms can
have objective referents.  Likewise,  we can ask
this question about moral terms. This question
frames  a  historical  debate  between  Francis
Hutcheson,  who  may  have  believed  that  our
moral sentiments track objective moral truths,
and David Hume, who suggests that morality
depends on human responses.  The claim that
moral  judgments  track  objective  properties  is
called the moral sense theory. It seems to have
been  defended  by  Francis  Hutcheson  in  the
eighteenth  century.  It  may  even  have  been
Kant’s considered view, since he had an object-
ive procedure for arriving at moral truth, but
also insisted that every moral judgment is asso-
ciated  with  a  moral  feeling.  The  moral  sense
view finds an analogue in contemporary authors
who combine external standards of moral truth
with motivationally charged moral psychologies
(e.g.,  Campbell 2007;  Copp 2001;  see  also
Railton 2009, who makes a modest move in that
direction).  The  alternative  view,  which  says
that moral judgments refer to response-depend-
ent  properties,  has  been  called  the  sensibility
theory (McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987). We can
now ask  whether  there  is  any  way to  decide
between these options empirically.
I think there is some reason to favor sens-
ibility  over  moral  sense.  For  the  moral  sense
theory to be true, there would have to be a can-
didate  objective  property  to  which  our  moral
concepts  could  refer.  Unfortunately,  I  cannot
undertake a review of modern moral sense the-
ories here, but I will offer, instead, a more gen-
eral  line  of  empirically-informed  resistance.
Moral  rules  are  emotionally  conditioned,  and
communities condition people to avoid a wide
range of different behaviors. Within a given so-
ciety, the range of things that we learn to con-
demn is  remarkably  varied.  Examples  include
physical harm, theft, unfair distributions, neg-
lect, disrespect, selfishness, self-destruction, in-
sults,  harassment,  privacy  invasions,  indecent
exposure,  and  sex  with  the  wrong  partners
(children,  animals,  relatives,  people  who  are
married to other people). One might think that
all of these wrongs have a common underlying
essence. For example,  one might propose that
each involves a form of harm. But this is simply
not true. Empirical evidence shows that people
condemn actions that have no victims, such as
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consensual sex between adult siblings and eat-
ing the bodies of people who die in accidents
(Murphy et al. 2000). Furthermore, harm itself
is a subjective construct. It cannot be reduced
to something like physical injury. Privacy viola-
tions  are  regarded  as  a  kind  of  harm,  even
though  they  don’t  hurt  or  threaten  health,
whereas manual labor is not considered a harm,
but it threatens the body more than, say, theft.
Similar problems arise if we try to define moral
wrongs in terms of autonomy violations. Man-
datory education  violates  autonomy,  but  it  is
considered good, and consensual incest is an ex-
pression of autonomy, but is considered bad.
Realists  would  no  doubt  resist  some  of
these claims, but theirs is an uphill battle. On
the face of it, morality lacks a common denom-
inator. Empirical surveys of human values sug-
gest that moral rules are a potpourri, which can
be extended and contracted in any number of
ways, with no fixed ingredients. Or rather, the
common denominator is not a property shared
by the things we condemn, but rather by the
condemning  itself.  Moral  sense  theorists  liken
morality to perception, and, in so doing, they
imply that there is an external feature of the
world  that  our  moral  sentiments  pick  up  on.
But there is little reason to believe this. Unlike
perception, there is  massive variation in what
we moralize, and there is a perfectly good ex-
planation for this: the content of morality is de-
termined by social conditioning rather than by
the  mind-independent  world.  Morality  is  not
something we get by simply observing.
The  foregoing  is  offered  as  an  empirical
challenge to moral sense theories, not a decisive
refutation. Too often philosophers stick with ex-
amples  of  moral  norms  that  clearly  concern
harm or  violations  of  autonomy.  This  inflates
optimism about a unifying essence. If one uses
empirical methods to discover the full range of
things  that  people  actually  moralize  (such  as
victimless harms), the task of finding a unified
essence looks much harder. Moral sense theor-
ists might reply that this diversity is  illusory.
They might say, for example, that people would
stop condemning victimless crimes on reflection.
That  claim  is  amenable  to  empirical  testing,
and so far the tests provide little support. For
example, Murphy et al. (2000) presented people
with cases of incest and cannibalism where it
was extremely salient that no one was harmed.
They invited people to revise knee jerk moral
intuitions and rule that, on reflection, these vic-
timless actions are permissible. A piddling 20%
revised accordingly, but 80% stuck to their ori-
ginal view. Moral sense theories seem to place
their bets on the 20%. The challenge is to ex-
plain why the stubborn and considered opinions
of the majority are performance errors of some
kind.
Given the diversity of things about which
people moralize, I think the sensibility theory is
more  promising  than  the  moral  sense  theory.
Wrongness  is  projected,  not  perceived.  The
property of being wrong is the property of caus-
ing  negative  sentiments,  not  a  response-inde-
pendent property that those sentiments are de-
signed to detect.  This conclusion follows from
an inference to the best explanation. Empiric-
ally it looks as if there is no common essence to
the things that we find morally wrong—a find-
ing  that  is  difficult  to  explain  on  the  moral
sense model, but easy to explain on the assump-
tion that wrongness is response dependent. By
analogy, imagine that we catalogue the things
that make people laugh, and find that they lack
a  shared  essence.  This  would  imply  that
laughter does not pick up on an objective prop-
erty. The things that we find funny are unified
by the very fact that we are amused by them.
Likewise for the things we find immoral: disap-
probation carves the moral landscape.
2.5 Relativism vs. ideal observers
I have just been arguing that moral truth is re-
sponse-dependent.  Moral  judgments  can  be
true, but their truth depends on our sentiments.
Something is immoral if it causes anger, disgust,
guilt, and shame in us. But now we can ask,
who does “us” refer to here? Whose sentiments
determine moral truth? This brings us to the fi-
nal  question  in  the  metaethics  decision  tree.
Can  divergent  responses  have  equal  claim  to
truth?
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that
moral sentiments vary, both within and across
Prinz, J. (2015). Naturalizing Metaethics.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 30(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570511 22 | 27
www.open-mind.net
cultures. Within a culture, the clearest divisions
are between political orientations. Liberals and
conservatives  have  interminable  debates,  even
when they are exposed to the same science and
education. Research suggests that these debates
come down to fundamental differences in moral
values. Conservatives are much more likely than
liberals to emphasize purity, authority, and pre-
servation  of  the  in-group  in  justifying  their
moral  norms  (Haidt 2007).  These  things  are
foundational for conservatives and largely irrel-
evant to liberals. 
Across  cultures,  differences  are  even
greater. Everything that we condemn is accep-
ted  somewhere  else  (such  as  slavery  and  tor-
ture), and things that have been condemned by
other cultures (such as women’s suffrage) have
been embraced by us. There are cultures whose
moral outlooks are dominated by considerations
that we tend to downplay in the post-industrial
West  (sanctity  and  honor,  for  example),  and
ideals that are central to our moral outlook ap-
pear to be modern inventions (rights and the
idea of human equality). 
Descriptively, then, people do not seem to
have the same moral  values,  within or  across
cultures. There is divergence in our sentiments.
Some of  this  divergence  might  diminish if  we
filtered out cases where people were reasoning
badly or on poor evidence, but there is ample
evidence  that  disagreements  remain  among
people  who reason carefully  and draw on the
same factual knowledge. Indeed, if we filter for
good  reasoning,  divergence  might  increase
rather  than  decrease:  consider  professional
normative ethicists, who are experts at reason-
ing but nevertheless arrive at varied and novel
moral  perspectives  that  neither  converge  with
each other nor with the communities to which
they belong. 
I  think such descriptive moral  relativism
provides support for metaethical moral relativ-
ism. This would be a terrible inference on its
own, as every metaethics textbook points out,
but the inference gains plausibility if bolstered
by a premise I argued for above: moral truth is
dependent on our responses. If responses vary,
even under favorable epistemic conditions, and
responses determine truth, then the truth of a
moral judgment can vary depending on whose
values are being expressed.
The ethical universalist can resist this con-
clusion by offering an antidote to moral vari-
ation. The most natural strategy would be to
defend universality by developing an ideal ob-
server  theory,  and to  argue  that,  under  ideal
epistemic  conditions  (which  might  include ex-
ternal factors as well as being an epistemically
ideal agent),  judges would arrive at the same
set of moral values. This strikes me as woefully
unlikely. Once we grant that sentimentalism is
true, and that our sentiments track response-de-
pendent properties, it’s not clear how to settle
on  which  observer  is  ideal.  Two  people  who
have the same factual knowledge may have dif-
ferent  sentiments  as  a  result  of  differences  in
temperament (Lovett et al. 2012), reward sens-
itivity (Moore et al. 2011), gender (Fumagalli et
al. 2010),  class  (Côté et  al. 2013),  and  age
(Truett 1993).  Whose  sentiments  are  right?
Moreover,  the  standard  traits  associated  with
ideal  observation  may  be  problematic  in  the
moral domain. Should we consult someone who
is disinterested when we know, empirically, that
distance from a situation can lead to moral in-
difference? Should we consult someone who has
not  been  conditioned  by  a  particular  culture
when we know that innate sentiments are un-
likely to deliver moral attitudes? Should we con-
sult someone who attends to every detail of a
case, when we know that framing, vivid descrip-
tion,  and  concreteness  can  alter  moral  judg-
ments?  These  problems  strike  me  as  insuper-
able. There are no clear criteria for ideal obser-
vation and no reason to believe that careful ob-
servers would converge.
In  posing  this  challenge,  I  am  inviting
ideal  observer  theorists  to  look  at  empirical
findings and propose epistemic standards that
would overcome the sources of  variation men-
tioned here. Some ideal observer theories try to
be empirically responsive in this way. For ex-
ample,  Smith (1994)  advances  the  hypothesis
that ideal rational agents would converge, but
he also realizes that some readers might be re-
luctant to share his optimistic outlook. To quell
these doubts he makes three empirical observa-
tions (p. 188): there is considerable moral con-
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vergence already (he cites the existence of thick
concepts as evidence: we all think brutality is
bad and honesty is good); there has been moral
progress  (he  cites  slavery,  among  other  ex-
amples); and entrenched disagreements often re-
flect faulty rationality, such as religious beliefs.
Here, I think further empirical scrutiny would
weaken  Smith’s  case.  Divergence  is  rampant,
and people disagree on the scope of thick con-
cepts  (is  torture  brutal?  is  espionage
dishonest?). Cases of (what we consider to be)
moral progress are, I’ve noted, often driven by
economic upheavals and other irrational factors,
with reasoning playing a post-hoc role. Finally,
disagreements remain after  bad reasoning and
religiosity are controlled for; the examples men-
tioned,  in  formulating  the  challenge  include
things such as temperament and framing effects.
I think empirical evidence provides little reason
to expect that rational and informed observers
would deliver consistent verdicts.
In light of such worries, universalists might
abandon the ideal observer theory and offer in-
stead a procedural approach to consensus, ar-
guing that people would and should converge if
they  arrived  at  their  sentiments  in  the  right
way.  For  example,  many  people  might  agree
that it is good to arrive at decisions democratic-
ally, taking multiple sentiments into considera-
tion,  and we might  sentimentally  endorse  the
outcome  of  democratically-resolved  moral  dis-
putes. Though I cannot make the case here, I
suspect  the  problems  with  such  a  procedural
approach  outweigh  its  prospects.  Democratic
decision-making does not result  in moral con-
sensus; it can even polarize. When such proced-
ures  increase  consensus  it  is  often  through
power and prestige rather than sentimental con-
vergence.  Our  faith  in  democratic  procedures
may also be an expression of moral relativism
rather than a solution. Democratic procedures
are an historical anomaly, which emerged in the
modern period with the rise of capitalism, and
they have often been used to oppress minorities
and to impose the values of the many over the
few. Perhaps such procedures are an improve-
ment over totalitarian forms of decision-making,
but they do not remedy relativism. Indeed, as
societies move towards consensus-building pro-
cedures,  they may actually promote variation,
leading to an endless proliferation of values and
an ever widening gulf between those who cher-
ish diversity and those who reside in more tradi-
tional societies. From a social science perspect-
ive, the prospects for a universal morality look
grim.
Once the case for relativism is established,
the question arises: relative to what? Are moral
judgments relative to value systems? Are those
systems  individuated  at  the  scale  of  cultures
and subcultures or do they vary across individu-
als? Little empirical work has been done to ad-
dress this question, but let me end with a sug-
gestion about how to proceed. When examining
the semantics of natural kind terms, philosoph-
ers have sometimes appealed to a linguistic divi-
sion of labor (Putnam 1975). We defer to ex-
perts  and  thereby  license  them to  adjudicate
the boundaries between natural kinds. Now we
can ask, is there such a thing as moral expert-
ise?  Do  we  appeal  implicitly  or  explicitly  to
moral  experts?  Would  we  change  our  moral
judgments  if  the  designated  members  of  our
community told us we were morally mistaken?
We don’t know the answers to such questions,
because  moral  expertise  has  not  been  intens-
ively studied. I suspect there will be consider-
able  individual  differences,  with  members  of
more traditional societies showing more willing-
ness to defer. But I also suspect that deference
in the moral domain will be less prevalent than
for natural kinds; we are more inclined to take
ourselves  as  having  morally  authoritative  in-
sight. What is most clear, however, is whether
the scope of  the relativity depends ultimately
on how we use moral concepts and terms; and
this is something that can be investigated em-
pirically. Naturalizing relativism will require the
marriage of cultural anthropology and sociolin-
guistics.  From the armchair, it is  tempting to
think there is a single true morality; introspect-
ive reflection tends towards solipsism.
3 Conclusion 
Throughout this discussion, we have worked our
way  down  a  metaethics  decision  tree.  I  have
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made  a  case  for  a  relativist  cognitivist  senti-
mentalist sensibility theory. Admittedly, each of
my arguments  is  only  a first  pass,  and much
more could be said for and against these posi-
tions.  Many  of  the  empirical  findings  that  I
have described are preliminary. My main goal
here is not to make a decisive case for any posi-
tion in  metaethics.  Rather,  I  am pleading for
the relevance of empirical methods in doing this
traditionally  philosophical  work.  Moral  philo-
sophy is undergoing a process of naturalization.
This has been felt most strongly in normative
theory  (e.g.,  the  debate  about  the  status  of
character in virtue ethics) and moral psychology
(e.g.,  questions  about  how  deontological  and
consequentialist judgments are made). I hope to
have shown that the empirical work also bears
directly  on  metaethical  questions—questions
about what, if anything, is the source of moral
truth. 
Empirical work cannot replace philosoph-
ical toil. We need philosophy to pose questions
and  identify  possible  theories.  Experimental
design is itself a kind of philosophical reasoning,
and  it  takes  considerable  argumentation  to
move  from  data  to  theory.  Naturalization  is
supplementation, not usurpation. But it is not
just  supplementation.  The  empirical  arsenal
may  just  be  our  best  hope  for  adjudicating
philosophical  debates.  Reflection can delineate
the logical  space,  but  we need observation to
locate ourselves  therein.  Philosophers  have  al-
ways relied on observation, in some sense, but
scientific methods allow us to observe processes
that  are  unconscious,  inchoate,  or  distant  in
space and time. Empirical studies can test the
content,  prevalence,  and  malleability  of  intu-
itions, and they can also tell us where our intu-
itions  come  from—a  question  of  central
metaethical  concern.  We  should  embrace  any
tools that help us resolve the questions that we
are employed to answer. A century ago, there
was a linguistic turn, and philosophers began to
treat  traditional  philosophical  problems  as
amenable  to  semantic  analysis.  Around  the
same  time,  the  boundary  between  philosophy
and psychology was still  blurred, and journals
such as  Mind published articles that we might
now  classify  as  psychological.  Such  crossovers
fell out of fashion, however, and it has taken a
century to get back to this incipient moment.
With the linguistic turn, Anglophone philosoph-
ers became convinced that we should all learn
logic because it would help us make progress.
Logic did help, and it did not undermine philo-
sophy. Now, we can encourage all philosophers
to learn about methods and results used in the
relevant social and physical sciences. The payoff
of this naturalistic turn may be vastly greater
than the linguistic turn. Science, not formal lo-
gic, is positioned to tell us whether morality is a
human construction.
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